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“In conservation, where positive outcomes are rarely 
articulated, difficult to achieve, and often impossible to measure 
to any degree of certainty, fads may be particularly prevalent. 
The skipping from fad to fad may not reflect the introduction 
of something truly novel, as such, but rather a repackaging of 
an old approach, which may or may not have had some 
beneficial effect, into something perceived as new.” 
(Redford et al., 2013, p. 437)  
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Abstract 
While deforestation rates continue to increase in Peru, REDD+ -which stands for 
“reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
in developing countries”- has emerged as the mainstream mechanism to mitigate Climate 
Change through forest conservation under a results-based payment scheme. Launched in 
Peru since 2008, its implementation has unveiled that institutional weaknesses within the 
forestry apparatus jeopardize the success of the program. From a forest governance 
approach, this study analyzes to what extent REDD+ goals have been achieved and what 
could be failing. Based on an assessment of the latest official data on Peruvian forests 
loss, virtual surveys to measure stakeholders' perception on forest governance, and 
interviews to specialists, the study points to a double failure. On the one hand, REDD+ 
has been unable to reduce emissions from deforestation; on the other hand, 
the low perception levels of forest governance principles (participation, transparency and 
accountability) reveal poor legitimacy of REDD+ among relevant 
organizations. Interestingly, results show that perceived levels of accountability were much 
lower than perceived levels of participation, which calls into question the quality of the 
participation processes themselves. Results also indicate unequal participation of 
stakeholders; indigenous organizations do not consider to have effectively participated in 
REDD+, unlike cooperation organizations and research institutions. Gender disparities 
have also been noticed; female respondents perceive REDD+ process two times less 
transparent and five times less accountable than male respondents. The study concludes 
with some recommendations to enhance forest governance.  
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Introduction 
Since 1992, when the parties in Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit agreed that Climate Change is 
a concern that demanded immediate action, forests have increasingly been positioned at the 
center of the debate since deforestation is the "second-leading cause of climate change after 
burning fossil fuels and accounts for nearly 20% of all GHG emissions" (FAO, 2018b, p. 
15). Furthermore, global reports indicate that 2016 and 2017 reached record levels of forest 
loss. 
In this sense, COP11 in 2005 saw the birth of RED, a global, technical and financial effort 
to tackle deforestation. Over the years, the program took shape and gained greater 
responsibilities. In 2007 its name changed to REDD and in 2009 the term was finally 
coined as REDD+, standing for "Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management 
of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks" (UNFCCC, 2010, p. 11). 
Peru has a great importance for this initiative since it has 13% of the Amazon forest, the 
second country with the biggest share, only after Brazil; but this percentage is decreasing 
annually. For the 2001-2014 period, 1,653,129 ha of Amazonian humid forests disappeared 
at an average annual rate of 118,080,10 ha. For 2014, data shows a growing rate and a 
higher slope in relation to the last 4 years (MINAM, 2016a, p. 16). 
To date, the country has several experiences with the implementation of REDD+ at 
different scales and levels, which are being integrated through the nested approach 
established to progressively form the national REDD+ framework. However, the progress 
of this program has depended on the strength of the institutions working on forests issues, 
as well as the capacity to effectively govern them. It has been reported that forest 
governance in Peru is far from having a good performance, which generates slowness in 
obtaining results and frustration on stakeholders. 
Under the framework of forest governance, which describes the way in which people and 
organizations govern and regulate forests, this research has the central objective of 
understanding why REDD+ has not been able to reduce deforestation, through the 
collection of information directly from the implementers, the application of virtual 
perception surveys and interviews with specialists. 
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The thesis is divided into 6 chapters. The first two state the state of the art in 
environmental and institutional terms in which the program is immersed. Basically, the 
most recent official data on forest loss globally and nationally are presented; and 
subsequently the global climate architecture developed by the UNFCCC through the 
COPs, detailing the evolution of REDD+. 
The third chapter makes a theoretical review and proposal of forest governance as an ideal 
framework and technical tool. The studies at international and national level that have 
attempted to answer the same question of the present study are also detailed. 
The fourth chapter presents the methodological framework. It details the central problem, 
the research question and the different stages that were necessary to respond to the 
apparent inability of REDD+ to reach the goals that were initially proposed. 
The fifth and sixth chapters report the results of the surveys and interviews. Making use of 
the concepts and previous studies proposed in the previous chapters, results cross between 
the different variables studied, which indicate deficiencies in terms of gender gaps, 
participation, transparency and accountability. This allows us to conclude that the program 
does not have legitimacy among the stakeholders. 
This thesis represents an authentic effort to contribute to forestry studies focused on 
environmental policies in Peru. It is becoming increasingly necessary to conduct evidence-
based research that demonstrates that any program that aims to improve the ecosystem and 
forestry quality of a nation needs roots among the diverse organizations and citizens linked 
to the forests. 
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1. Environmental State of Art: Climate Change1 and Forests  
1.1. Global and Peruvian Forests Synthesis 
Our planet has gone through radical temperature changes. However, it is the atmosphere 
that, in addition to providing us with the oxygen we breathe, settles the conditions for a 
balanced temperature of the planet.  The gases that inhabit the atmosphere, which we 
know as Greenhouse Gases (GHGs), helps regulate the temperature of the earth's surface. 
GHGs regulate the temperature by blocking the long waves of energy from the sun on the 
planet earth; so, when the sun emits rays, the GHGs retain the heat and then returns to 
space in the form of infrared radiation. The greater the presence of these gasses in the 
atmosphere, the infrared radiation is prevented from being expelled to space; this causes 
the atmosphere and the earth to continue heating up. This is what is known as the 
greenhouse effect.  
One of the most important GHGs is CO
2
, which is mainly a gas produced by the burning 
of fossil fuels (such as oil and its derivatives). The power plants that provide energy and its 
subsequent anthropogenic use emit CO
2 
into the atmosphere. Historically, this has been 
the principal example where human being generates CO
2
 in his daily life, among common 
habits such as washing, eating, and transporting. 
Therefore, because of the direct and indirect human activity, climate change represents an 
alteration of global atmosphere composition and natural climate variability over time (UN, 
1992, p. 7).  
Global amount of GHGs emissions are slowing in growth, but have shown an increase 
(0.5%) in 2016, accounting for 49.3 Gt CO
2 
eq. This amount does not include land use, 
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), this indicator normally express the emission’s 
share for deforestation and forests degradation, because of its high levels of inter annual 
variations and methodological uncertainty (Olivier et al., 2017, p. 8).  
One of the most important concerns for CC is the global forest; its importance for 
mitigation strategies is central to organize the backbone priorities within the global 
                                                          
1
 In this thesis, Climate Change and its acronym CC will be used interchangeably. 
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environmental and political agenda2. Let us do a short description of the current situation, 
over a global and local scale, regarding forests and the GHG emissions. 
Global Synthesis 
Forests play a structural role in the GHG concentration dynamics. Roughly, they soak-up 2 
Gt. CO
2 
eq. each year; therefore, they represent a leading mitigation and adaptation option 
with high cost-effective carbon-sequester ability (IPCC, 2014).  
In the latest report on The State of World’s Forests (FAO, 2018a), it is stated that 
“deforestation is the second-leading cause of climate change after burning fossil fuels and 
accounts for nearly 20% of all GHG emissions” (FAO, 2018a, p. 15).  
Chart 1: Global Tropical Tree Cover Loss, 2001-2017 (Millions of Hectares)  
 
Source: WRI (2018) 
 
 
By 2015, global forests accounts for almost 4 billion hectares. Through the 1990-2015 
period, global forest cover declined 3.1% (FAO, 2015), but between 1990–2000 and 2010–
2015 periods, “global forest net area loss has slowed by more than 50%” (FAO, 2015, p. 
16). As seen in Chart 1, by 2016, global tree cover loss reached new record rates with 29.7 
                                                          
2
 Especially for developing countries, where happens to exist a clear correlation between forest cover loss and 
poverty (Sunderlin et al., 2007; Miyamoto et al., 2014; Keenan et al., 2015). 
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million hectares (51% more than 2015), mainly due to an increase in forest fires and 
LULUCF3 (WRI, 2018). 
It is worth noting that, usually, discussions over CC tend to be confined over CO2 
sequester. But the latest research on noncarbon effects of deforestation shows that the 
major impact arise when factors beyond CO2 are taken into account: the liberation of 
other GHGs, earth’s albedo, the “radioactive forcing” effect, surface roughness or 
evapotranspiration (Wolosin & Harris, 2018). During 2015, 2016 and 2017, noncarbon 
GHG emissions have shown faster growth than CO2, but still they account for only 28% 
in total emissions (Olivier et al., 2017, p. 4).   
Peruvian Synthesis 
South America is a severely affected region by CC, with high climate variability and 
increasingly exposed to extreme events, verified in growing annual precipitation trends, 
anomalous warming and extreme rainfalls that favors landslides and unexpected social-
ecological losses (IPCC, 2014, p. 27).  
The region is virtually dissected by the Andes mountain chain, which separates the Pacific 
from the Atlantic watersheds. Such a division, generates incalculable biodiversity and 
ecological richness, but also represents an ancient and fertile territory for intensive 
agriculture. Increase on this activity has been reported to be the main reason for 
deforestation and land degradation, yet the region has multiple stressors (IPCC, 2014, p. 
1504).  
Both Central America and South America, represents 69% of the total world deforestation 
by 2010. Brazil is certainly the country accountable for the highest deforested area (FAO, 
2015), followed by Bolivia, Venezuela, and Argentina. In this sense, Amazonian 
deforestation has received special attention due to rampant rates of forest loss. 
Perú owns 13% of the Amazon forest, the second country with the biggest share, only after 
Brazil, and the ninth country with the highest forest coverage in the world. This represents 
                                                          
3 LULUCF emissions inclusion within global quantification for 2016 increases the total figure in 4.1 Gt. CO2 
eq., turning an equivalent of 53.4 Gt. CO2 eq. (Olivier et al., 2017). Not including this factor makes the trend 
in global CO2 (Carbon Dioxide) emissions flat and almost stationary, over 2016 and 2015 (Olivier et al., 
2017, p. 4).   
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a vast territory where pressure over land materializes in competing uses, based on global 
and local demands for food, energy, and minerals (IPCC, 2014, p. 1513).  
In addition, socio-economic conditions and poverty are reported to be directly correlated 
to the country’s deforestation rates (Sunderlin et al., 2007; Zwane, 2007; Choumert et al., 
2013; Joshi & Beck, 2017).  
Peruvian natural forests represent the biggest ecosystem with a 56% share of national 
territory. They are classified in Amazonian humid forests (68,188,726 ha, 53.06%), coastal 
stationary dry forests (3,674,364 ha, 2.86%) and Andean forests (220,173 ha, 0.17%) 
(MINAM, 2015b); therefore, Amazonian humid forests represent 94.06% of total national 
forests area. 
By 2017, Peruvian population reached 31,237,385 habitants, whereof 332,975 are directly 
forest-dependent (INEI, 2018). Ecosystem services and conservation efforts are crucial not 
only for forest-dependent communities, but for voluntary isolated and initially contacted 
indigenous population (Población Indígena en Aislamiento Voluntario y Contacto Inicial), 
which are considered to be transcendent actors in national existing forest policies 
(MINAM, 2016a, 2017b). 
Peru is considered to be a “High Forest – Low Deforestation” country (IPCC, 2014). The 
National Strategy for Forests and Climate Change (ENBCC) developed a study during the 
2001-2014 period, showing that 1,653,129 ha of Amazonian humid forests were deforested 
at an average annual rate of 118,080,010 ha. For 2014, data shows a growing rate and a 
higher slope in relation to the last 4 years (MINAM, 2016a, p. 36). Overall, the increasing 
tendency of annual deforestation shown in Chart 2 is evident. 
During the same period, almost 3.5% of Peruvian deforestation is attributed to non-human 
causes, for instance, forest-to-water-bodies conversions linked to river channel’s 
movement. This losses are highly relevant because their increase follows the imminent pace 
of global CC (MINAM, 2015b). 
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Chart 2: Annual loss of Peruvian Amazonian Humid Forests between 2001-2014 (in 
hectares)  
 
Source: MINAM (2015d).  
 
In 2017, 143 425 ha were deforested, some higher than the average annual rate of 2001-
2014 period, but the lowest net loss was between 2012-2017 period and there was a 
considerable fall of 13% respecting 2016 (Finer et al., 2018).  
1.2. Peruvian Deforestation Dynamics 
In 2015, MINAM tasked an independent study to AIDER, a Peruvian environmental 
NGO, to analyze the agents, causes and spatial patterns of Amazonian deforestation, for 
the 2001-2013 timeframe. The study was part of the National Reference Levels document, 
presented to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
in the context of the National Determined Contributions (NDCs) (MINAM, 2015d). 
The 9 conclusions generated in the study guides the path for government actions towards 
deforestation in the country. They will be described as follows:  
(1) 25 alarming fragments of forest loss were identified in the Amazon, they 
showed accumulated activity associated with roads and river axis. 
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(Bax et al., 2016, pp. 84, 85)(2, 3) Ecological fragmentation is driven by direct 
productive characteristics causes, mainly agricultural (95%); after deforestation, 
land-use turned to secondary vegetation (38.40%), agriculture (32.80%), pastures 
(24.30%), mining (3.60%), bare soil (0.40%), other lands (0.40%) and artificial lands 
(0.20%) (AIDER, 2015). 
Most of this forest loss is concentrated in small 5 ha units, the sum of them 
accounts for 82% of total accumulated deforestation4. This has lead to an official 
and widely accepted explanation for deforestation: Agriculture, mainly migratory 
and small-scale (IPCC, 2014; UNFCCC, 2015b; MINAM, 2015b, 2017b). 
This reasoning turns to be confusingly emblematic. In the first place, it directly 
blames the migrants of Amazonian territory –exculpating other powerful groups; 
secondly, it misleads deforestation’s actors-dynamics, which could include from 
small-scale migratory agriculture to pastures or mining (as AIDER’s (2015) research 
shows); and thirdly, the information upon which it is originally based refers only to 
specific parcel sizes, not to the total deforested area (Ravikumar et al., 2017). 
Other recent report comes from the MAAP project, an initiative from Amazon 
Conservation Association and Amazonian Conservation (ACCA) (Finer & Novoa, 
2017). Eight deforestation hotspots are identified and, again, the main drivers are 
small-scale agriculture and cattle grazing, while latent drivers are big-scale agriculture 
and highway construction –which we could easily call institutionalized deforestation.  
Discriminating between who, why and where deforestation is occurring is crucial for 
policy design. Most of the time, small-scale deforestation is driven by subsistence 
agriculture, where 68.9% is for self-consumption and mainly started in secondary 
forests (AIDER, 2015), which evolves in a relatively stable pattern of land-use, 
ending up in diversified crop fields, pastures or agro forestry (Pinedo-Vasquez et al., 
2002).  
Such conversions are usually driven by credit offers, locally popular future benefits 
offered by palm-oil companies and government organisms (Bennett et al., 2018), or 
opportunities that surges from commodities’ global boom-periods -including 
                                                          
4
 Literature review shows variation in this matter. AIDER (2015) research indicates an 88% accountable for 
small-scale fragmented defforestation; while Finer and Novoa (2017) propose an 80% figure.  
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cocaine production and traffic (Salisbury & Fagan, 2011; Bax & Francesconi, 2018, 
p. 100).  
(4) As already mentioned, economical factors (such as PBI or income) represents a 
transversal driver for deforestation and are statistically correlated, specially for cash 
crops like coffee, cocoa and palm-oil, which, in parallel, receives “subsidies, 
incentives and tax exemption” (Pirard & Belna, 2012, pp. 67, 68).  
 (5) In the near-future term, it is expected the construction of new highways that 
will increase the agricultural frontier in the low-forest, divergent to historical high-
forest occupation. 
(6) Also, attributed to growing investment availability, agent’s capacity to clear 
forests in middle-range patches (3.0 - 19.9 ha) is continuously increasing, divergent 
to small-scale patches (<0.5 ha) previously stated.  
(7) International commodity prices play an important role as well. Cash crops, meat 
and gold are increasing their share in national economy’s primary sector and 
deforestation causes; as their prices in international markets rise, local incentives 
proportionally rise (MINAM, 2015d, p. 24). 
(8, 9) Finally, governance dynamics regarding decentralization policies and 
immigration fluxes represents serious difficulties for enhancing environmental 
improvements. On one side, provincial government has received more 
competencies regarding forests management, what is perceived as a drawback 
because of the lack of technical capacities and rampant corruption; on the other 
side, low-forest immigration from the Andes fosters the pronounced inequalities of 
opportunities between the regions of the country. 
 
  
 
 
8 
 
2. Institutional State of Art: Climate Change Agreements, REDD+ and Peruvian 
uptakes 
After reviewing the environmental reality of forests, the following chapter provides a 
chronological description of the international institutional evolution of climate change and 
deforestation.  
Let us do a retrospective of the relevant COP’s and how this apparatus has shaped its 
decisions towards what we call REDD+ today (“Reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks” (UN-REDD+, 2016)).  
2.1. COPs and REDD+ as the Solution 
It all starts in 1992, with the Earth Summit celebrated in Rio de Janeiro. Among the 
Convention on Biologic Diversity (UNCBD) and the Convention to Combat 
Desertification (UNCCD), the UNFCCC was signed.  
The latter is the treaty of importance for this research, because it paves the way for the 
design and implementation of mechanisms that stabilize GHGs concentration in the 
atmosphere. In this Convention it was specified that although there is no scientific 
certainty that human activity generates and increases its concentration, the matter must be 
dealt with anyway.  
In 1994, Perú recognizes the UNFCCC and becomes an official party. It establishes the 
first step that enforces the nation to formulate and apply national programs for CC 
mitigation. 
From then on, it is agreed to have annual meetings, called the Conference of the Parties 
(COP’s). In 1995, the first COP held in Berlin, set that countries must reach agreements to 
accomplish the necessary measures and instruments so CC -linked to economic growth, 
and sustainable development- could be stopped (UNFCCC, p. 5).  
In 1997, Kyoto Protocol is proposed, coming into force in Perú in 2005 and ratified in 
2009. Among its various measures, the Article 3/1 called to reduce CO2 emissions from 
industrialized countries in less than 5% below 1990 levels (UNFCCC, 1998, p. 3), as well as 
article 11/b that calls for green-technology transfer finance, in order to enable poor 
countries to take over the full incremental costs of CC mitigation (UNFCCC, 1998, p. 11). 
 
 
9 
 
This international agreement failed. There are many ways to explain this; one of them is 
because the way industrialized countries must reduce emissions didn’t received much 
support between Annex I countries, mainly USA and China. This is commonly known as 
the structural problem. An alternative standpoint was given by Napoli (2012) using Olson’s 
(1965) research on the collective action problem.  
Departing from a cost-benefit analysis, Napoli explains that parties will only agree to 
reduce emissions if short-term net benefits from abatement were positive in a national 
basis; in detriment of pollution reductions for global benefit in the long run. While benefits 
of reducing emissions are perceived in long terms and costs are needed in short terms, 
some states seeking for global CO2 abatement find incentives to hang from others efforts, 
also known as free riding. 
“…until the collective action problem is overcome, structural adjustments in future 
agreements (…) will have little effect on pollution emission reductions.” (Napoli, 
2012, p. 1) 
Because of this failure, in 2005 Montreal’s COP11, new proposals were presented, one of 
them was RED mechanism (without “+”): a way in which industrialized countries could 
reduce emissions from deforestation, based on the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” (CBDR) (UN, 1992, p. 9) and applying the concept of compensated reduction, 
proposed by Brazilian and Indonesian researchers in a famous editorial essay (Santilli et al., 
2005)5. The central idea of RED was to reward people who conserve or restore forests as a 
way to reduce emissions, very close to the PES (Payment for Ecosystem Services) 
conception.    
In parallel, RED was proposed as a way that developing countries could integrate the 
carbon market by selling credits, strengthening CO2 storage value ahead of industrial 
values (Brunner et al., 2010).  
In 2007 Bali’s COP13, RED’s focus expanded and the FCPF6 joined with then-UN-RED 
(United Nations REDD Programme) started to support countries towards the program 
                                                          
5
 This concept, or instrument –as the authors called it-, would increase political empowerment of poor 
countries, who holds large amounts of carbon storage, in climate negotiations, allowing tropical countries 
taking real charge of national deforestation. 
6
 The FCPF is a climate fund created with donations from 15 countries and administered by the World Bank 
that supports preparatory activities and payment for performance of the REDD+ mechanism. For the 
preparation activities, also known as readiness process, the FCPF provides the countries participating in the 
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readiness. After several workshops happening after COP11 and the tool gaining 
momentum, specialists discussed about the mechanism broader scope. A relevant actor 
such as the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN) –integrated by tropical countries and 
already active in COP11 decisions-, recommended the inclusion of forest degradation as a 
big cause of emissions, as well as new funding procedures. With lots of criticism regarding 
the abandonment of a simple tool turning into a more technically complex one, finally, 
RED became REDD7.  
In consequence, at 2008 Poznan’s COP14, Peruvian then-Minister of Environment, 
Antonio Brack, pledged to conserve 54 million hectares of tropical forests; a year later, in 
2010, the Forest Conservation Program (Programa Bosques) emerges as one of the principal 
environmental policy of Perú (MINAM, 2010b). Ten years after COP14, the National 
Norm of Forest Conservation for CC Mitigation was given to regulate and enforce Brack’s 
commitment.  
COP14 saw the early stages of REDD+ coming. Elements like forests’ sustainable 
management, conservation and carbon stocks enhancement were included in the 
mechanism, equalizing the avoidance of deforestation and forest degradation. The plus sign 
aimed to add co-benefits to the mechanism, amplifying the scope of the countries who 
wanted to participate not only in forestry hard issues, but also in development related-
demands. 
By the same year in Perú, the Peruvian REDD+ Group (“Grupo REDD+ Perú”) was 
created. It is now the most active and prominent social participation platform concerning 
REDD+ in the country. The first meeting of this group was held on February 20, 2008, 
where several institutions from the public and private sector and NGO’s –surprisingly no 
indigenous organizations- gathered in WWF-Perú to discuss the baseline proposal of 
avoided deforestation in Peruvian Amazonia.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
fund with a donation of up to 3.8 million dollars. More than 30 countries participate in this fund and Peru is 
one of them. The preparation process within the FCPF has three phases: a) R-PIN (Idea Note for Readiness), 
Peru presented it in 2008; b) Preparation Proposal for “Readiness" (R-PP), Peru presented in 2011; c) 
Preparation Package (R-Package), Peru has not submitted it yet (DAR, 2013). 
7
 Following Bottcher et al. (2009) analysis on the change, the authors argued that this represented a big 
increase in costs and technical complexity. As REDD framework design depended heavily on  carbon 
monitoring quantification costs, deforestation is easier and less expensive to calculate than degradation (p. 
12).  
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Months later, more actors from indigenous groups became part of Grupo REDD+ and 
DAR (an important NGO which mainly works towards climate justice in Peru). Also in 
2008, Perú subscribed to Paraguay’s submission for UNFCCC, arguing that existing 
institutional capacities were insufficient and a nested approach -starting with sub-national 
initiatives and progressive blending- was necessary, in order to combine accounting and 
crediting methods, while strengthening local participation (Allan & Dauvergne, 2013, p. 
1316).  
Perú incorporated into FCPF readiness process by presenting the Idea Note for Readiness 
(R-PIN), elaborated by the Environmental Ministry (MINAM) and National 
Environmental Fund (FONAM). Also, an alliance between important environmental 
NGO’s developed decentralized workshops in provinces that ended up in the Tarapoto 
Declaration, a national agreement gathering central government, provincial governments, 
civil society, indigenous organizations, funding representatives, research institutions and 
interested companies (Che Piu & Menton, 2013, p. 44).  
In 2009 Copenhagen’s COP15, REDD was officially recognized as a fundamental tool to 
reduce emissions. A consensus was reached regarding the financial resources mobilization 
from Annex I to non-Annex I countries -USD 30 billion for 2010-2012 and USD 100 
billion for 2020 (UNFCCC, 2010, p. 7)-, and the call on countries to use official guidelines 
of IPCC (International Panel on Climate Change) to quantify GHGs emissions. COP16’s 
Decision 1 also defines REDD+ with a national policy approach, in order to strengthen 
the mechanism’s legitimacy and permeability towards already established national climate 
policies and initiatives. 
There are differing views regarding this new approximation. Centralizing forest 
governance, on one side, can increase abatement of GHGs with lower costs, albeit exposed 
to more bureaucracy (Angelsen, 2008); on the other side, a national approach can bolster 
the weakening of local institutions, increasing forest loss and continuing historical 
interactions with forest-dependent communities (Sandbrook et al., 2010). 
Despite many doubts, the national approach got support. As a result, in 2009, MINAM 
created the REDD+ Technical Group (“Grupo Técnico de REDD+”) and designed Grupo 
REDD+ Perú as the coordinator to support the Readiness Proposal (R-PP) to FCPF 
finance and apply to a Forest Investment Plan (FIP) as a pilot country.   
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In 2010 Cancun’s COP16, REDD complemented its goals. REDD officially became 
REDD+ with the formal adherence of new components, co-benefits, not just (1) 
“Reducing emissions from deforestation” and (2) “Reducing emissions from forest 
degradation”, but also (3) “Conservation of forest carbon stocks”, (4) “Sustainable 
management of forests” and (5) “Enhancement of forest carbon stocks” (UNFCCC, 2011, 
p. 12). 
For example, Chile, who doesn’t have major forests, can now be able to accede REDD+ 
finance by planting trees, enhancing its national carbon stocks (5). Perú is not likely to 
increase its carbon stocks, but can conserve them and reduce deforestation and forest 
degradation. The idea is to open the possibilities for countries and allow them to participate 
by choosing one of the five components.  
Among the relevant outcomes in COP16, early definitions of the safeguards were given, 
agreeing that each country must design the respective information system, mainly to inform 
how indigenous peoples and forest-dependent population are being protected from risky 
social-environmental consequences derived from REDD+; and the phased approach, 
which adopts a three-step implementation of REDD+.  
As already mentioned, in 2010 the MINAM approved the Programa Bosques. The preparation 
of this policy uncovered several forestry challenges; one of them was the overhauling of 
how existing CC initiatives could adapt to this new architecture. By that time, as said by C. 
Ochoa (personal communication, February 7, 2018), Peru already had pilot projects and a 
lot of uncertainty was perceived between the related institutions, regarding a methodology 
that clearly defines how to nationally apply REDD+. This will not be solved until 2013 in 
Warsaw’s COP19. 
In parallel, during 2010, then-President of Perú, Alan García, ratified the zero net 
deforestation goal towards 2021, before the 65th UN General Assembly. This effort 
represented reducing total national GHG emissions in 47.5% (MINAM, 2010a).  
In 2011 Durban’s COP17, more guidelines referring to financing paths, safeguards and 
reference levels were settled. Mostly explained in decision 12/CP.17 (UNFCCC, 2012, p. 
16), finance could be disbursed from several sources, grounding REDD+ as a market-
based mechanism which could deliver results-based projects; safeguards should have 
specific ways of reporting, depending on national conditions and capacities; and reference 
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levels -which didn’t have specific methodologies at the time- received essential basis for 
clear measurement, reporting and verification (MRV), keeping coherence with country’s 
inventories of anthropogenic GHGs emissions (UNFCCC, 2012, p. 17). 
Regarding Perú, an important meeting was held in Lima, where an Exploratory Mission 
from FIP representatives looked for a closer approach between authorities, national 
institutions and multilateral banks, concerning the elaboration of the National Forest 
Investment Strategy and the FIP’s Consultation for the Mechanism focused on Indigenous 
Peoples, which resulted in the Pachacamac Declaration (Che Piu & García, 2011, p. 11). 
These meetings guided MINAM to wedge national efforts into international requirements 
for REDD+ funding, giving multilateral banks the certainty that Perú was walking through 
the right path. 
After several revisions of the R-PP from FCPF, workshops between Grupo REDD+ Perú, 
MINAM and AIDESEP (Inter-Ethnic Association for Peruvian Jungle Development), R-
PP document was finished. During the 8th meeting of the Committee of Participants of 
the FCPF, held from March 23 to 25 in Da Lat, Vietnam, the allocation for Peru was 
approved for USD 3.6 million from the Readiness Fund for REDD+, after the 
government of Peru presented the document and announced the agreements reached by 
the above mentioned institutions (DAR, 2013). 
In 2012, Doha’s COP18 covered more MRV and REDD+ financing issues (UNFCCC, 
2013). The official UNFCCC entity in charge of MRV issues is the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). Related to this, some criticisms were 
reported due to the fact that the carbon quantification systems, MRV's frameworks and the 
national reference systems were worked incompletely (The REDD Desk, 2015). 
In this sense, the design of an appropriate standard for carbon storage verification 
represented a central discussion, because disproportionate transaction costs may 
undermine REDD+ goals and co-benefits (CIFOR, 2008, p. 118). Another issue was 
discussed under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-
LCA), regarding the necessary institutional arrangements, new ways of finance and new 
approaches towards sub-national initiatives for result-based payments (UNFCCC, 2013). 
Initiatives towards forests monitoring in Perú has been disperse. Information about 
deforestation dynamics comes from isolated institutions and researches, using different 
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methodologies and timeframes. By 2016, six entities distributed along MINAM and 
SERFOR (National Forestry and Wild Fauna Authority) were in some way linked to forest 
monitoring, generating isolated data and guided by different regulation (Capella, 2016, p. 
15). 
 This started to change with the already mentioned Programa Bosques, started in 2015, where 
yearly deforestation data –solely for humid Amazonian forests- is presented for 2000-2014 
period (MINAM, 2016a, p. 37). The same year, MINAM and SERFOR implemented the 
Forest Cover Monitoring module, the main institutional initiative for this matter.  
The module yearly provides information segmented in 5 sub-modules: (1) Forests and 
Forests Loss, (2) Early Alert, (3) Degradation, (4) Land-use change, and (5) Reference 
Scenario (MINAM, 2015c). This could only be achieved by the mandatory data 
requirements stated across all the above mentioned agreements for REDD+. 
The year 2013 was a watershed for REDD+. June saw giant steps in Bonn, at the inter-
session meetings of UNFCCC that paved the way “to addressing the drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation; modalities for national forest monitoring systems; 
and the timing and frequency of presentations of summary information on how safeguards 
are being addressed and respected” (The REDD Desk, 2015, p. 11). 
Warsaw’s COP19 is perceived as the most significant milestone for the mechanism because 
it finally explains what is REDD+, what is needed to accomplish it and if a country is 
actually doing it.  
Under a joint effort, the SBSTA –in charge of methodological aspects-, the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation (SBI) –in charge of the institutional arrangements-, and the main 
COP platform –in charge of the results-based finance aspects-, generated the Warsaw 
Framework for REDD+, which comprehend a synthesized framework of application, 
called the REDD+ Rulebook. 
COP19 consolidated the requirements and institutional arrangements’ guidance towards 
REDD+. According to Cancun Agreements, countries must elaborate (1) National Action 
Plans or Strategy, the only requirement fully developed in Peru8; (2) National reference 
level for forest emissions and/or a national forest reference level, or provisionally, sub 
                                                          
8
 The action plan is the ENBCC (MINAM, 2016a). 
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national levels; (3) National forest monitoring system; and (4) a system to provide 
information on the way in which the corresponding safeguards are being addressed and 
respected. 
This should fit into the three-phase approach, already agreed in Cancun, which 
progressively implements the mechanism upon the national circumstances and capacities, 
(1) Readiness, (2) Demonstration, and (3) Implementation.  
Phase 1 has to do with the design of the requirements and institutional arrangements 
mentioned above. Phase 2 basically tests the designed policies -eventually requiring third-
parties auditory-, capacity building, institutional re-arrangements and legal clarity regarding 
forests management. Phase 3 is the final stage which every country wants to achieve, 
because its where “countries can access results-based payments when they have completed 
the reporting, assessment and analysis processes under the UNFCCC” (UN-REDD+, 
2016, p. 3) 
In 2014, Lima’s COP20 wasn’t fruitful as the previous COP. There were no formal 
agreements, but important discussions regarding non-market benefits, safeguards and non-
market mechanisms, partially shined the path to COP21.  
Non-carbon benefits relate to all the efforts done in political, institutional and social-
environmental terms that do not involve direct carbon abatements. The discussion was 
about if this kind of efforts should represent CC direct interventions –so they can further 
be taken as results for payment, and thus be monetized (The REDD Desk, 2015, p. 15).  
Related to safeguards, the main concern is how to harmonize UNFCCC’s general 
conception of safeguards with each country’s particular framework on human rights, land 
rights, indigenous people’s agreements and consultation methods. What was stated in Lima 
was that every country must share common elements of reporting each party’s progress in 
a Safeguard Information System (SIS), which required further guidance (Corbera, 2017, p. 
504). Either way, no agreement was reached.  
Non-market mechanisms –ways of discourage emissions away from monetary retributions- 
was championed by Bolivian representatives. Their recommendations encourage countries 
to adopt alternative and holistic approximations to CC mitigation, “beyond the scope of 
REDD+” (The Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2012, p. 10), considering Indigenous People’s 
conception of nature, away from viewing natural resources solely as carbon stocks, but 
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from an interdependent relation framework, materialized in the “Law of Mother Earth and 
Integral Development for Living Well” (Bolivian Plurinational Legislation Assembly, 2012). 
This turned into a concrete but polemic proposition, named the Joint Mitigation and 
Adaptation (JMA) mechanism (The Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2012).   
Albeit the lack of strong and compulsory agreements in COP20, it was agreed that each 
party must propose prior COP21 their Intended National Determined Contributions 
(INDCs) (UNFCCC, 2015b, p. 28), or domestic reactions to CC, according to what each 
country considers to be applicable.  
After Lima, The Paris Agreement, drafted and signed in 2015 and 2016, respectively, tried 
to correct Kyoto Protocol massive failure. It essentially says that countries cannot maintain 
a way of development that contributes to the increase of global average temperature in 
more than 2 °C. Actually, parties should pursue “efforts to limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5 °C” (UNFCCC, 2015a, p. 2).   
COP21 received member states’ INDCs, what after ratification became no longer 
‘intended’, but plain NDCs. They represent a highly valuable resource to measure how 
countries are configuring their efforts upon deforestation and forest degradation (Bhan et 
al., 2017), as well as shows measurable aggregates to quantify the progress towards global 
2°C limit (UNFCCC, 2015a, p. 3). From this Conference until today, nothing has changed 
regarding the technical requirements and the necessary institutional architecture for 
implementing REDD+.  
2.2. A Critical Perspective for REDD+’s Evolution 
With the basic promise to reduce deforestation’s carbon emissions and forest degradation 
in developing countries, UNFCCC launched REDD+ as an incentive embedded in the 
“ecosystem services payments”, developed to financially reward pre-industrial and under-
developed countries for their efforts to reduce GHGs emissions from forests (CDSA, 
2017). 
In order to further understand REDD+ governance sequences in the light of governance 
principles, it is important to overhaul the evolution of CC agreements from a critical 
perspective. For this purpose, we have adapted Ciplet’s (2017) five phases of global climate 
governance in table 1.  
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Table 1: Phases of Global Climate Governance 
Phase Guiding principles 
Agreed Awareness Phase Global Agreement 
Liberal Environmentalism  
CBDR (UN, 1992). 
Polluter pays 
Cost-effectiveness 
Inclusive Multilateralism 
Kyoto 1997 Protocol Institutionalization of a regulatory framework 
Copenhagen 2009 Accord 
Pledge and review 
Shared Unaccountability 
Voluntary Action 
Durban 2012 Negotiations Informal Bilateral and Minilateral Agreements 
Source: Own elaboration, based on adapted information from Ciplet and Roberts (2017). 
 
The first phase initiates with Stockholm conference in 1970, establishing a public concern 
about the protection of ecosystems, calling governments to engage into a common effort 
to preserve human environment. Every country understood this goal individually, 
upholding self-determined rights and perceptions of development. This agreement pledged 
for financing aid from north to south countries’ group as a way to redeem responsibilities 
on climate impacts. 
The second phase starts with 1992 UNFCCC’s debate and approval in Rio de Janeiro, 
where the Brundtland Report took global attention with the idea of a harmonized 
economic growth and environmental commonality. UNFCCC cleared the responsibilities 
of Climate Change problem founded upon the ideas of “polluter pays” and “equity” related 
to mitigation budget. The structural decision-making format was based on the obligation of 
all the convention parties to work collectively and be represented within an inclusive 
multilateralism. 
The third phase started with 1997’s Kyoto Protocol. Through this phase, an international 
emission trading program was designed and implemented, “offsetting” carbon 
responsibilities through Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects.  
Kyoto Protocol replacement for Copenhagen Accord leveraged unprecedented civil society 
participation, replacing Annex 1 countries full responsibility for reducing emissions to 
“voluntary mitigation actions”.  CBDR principle was reduced, responsibility was no longer 
in the global north and now every party must shoulder CC mitigation, lacking specific 
duties. This is called shared un-accountability: “the agreement required that no one was 
required to act at any certain level” (Ciplet & Roberts, 2017, p. 152). 
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Durban Negotiations accepted Kyoto Protocol failure, agreeing to adopt a new 2015 
framework enforced in 2020. New forms of pledges were implemented, like INDCs 
(introduced in Warsaw-2013 and worked in Lima-2014), and USA-China joint pledge, 
signifying a shift on how mitigation efforts should be decided. 
After 48 years since Stockholm conference, Ciplet and Roberts (2017) phases shows us an 
evolution of shifts that concludes in a major difficulty to “prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UN, 1992, p. 9), materialized in the 
parties’ incapacity to attain the 1.5 °C limit. 
2.3. Peruvian REDD+ Status9 
Let us now make a jump and take a closer and summarized look to what Peru has done 
through the last decade and how it is today. As mentioned, Peru has acceded to 3 major 
international funds with the goal of promoting policies and actions towards the reduction 
of deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), and improving the terrestrial regulation.  
The country is a (1) REDD+ pilot actor to prepare a FIP; (2) member of the FCPF 
through the R-PP submission in 201410; and, since 2015, (3) a signatory of the Joint 
Declaration of Intention (DCI), a multilateral agreement of cooperation between Norway 
and Germany.  
We already know that the Warsaw Framework in COP19 consolidated the modalities to 
implement the 4 cornerstones of REDD+: (1) national strategies, (2) forest-emissions 
reference levels, (3) national forest monitoring system and (4) SIS (UNFCCC, 2013). 
Thereupon, this same order will be used to describe the Peruvian progress on REDD+ 
readiness. 
Perú has an action plan or REDD+ Strategy, the ENBCC, approved in June, 2016 through 
a supreme decree. In 2003, Peru already had a National Strategy for Climate Change; one 
of the resulting policies was precisely the ENBCC. Its elaboration started in 2015, the 
participative process was held in the same year and approved, like said, in 2016. The focal 
point for UNFCCC regarding REDD+ in Peru is Programa Bosques, which is under the 
                                                          
9 For this chapter, part of the information collected from the interview with Peruvian REDD+ specialist 
Claudia Ochoa will be added since it represents updated information that is not found in the literature 
reviewed. 
10
 This finance framework for REDD+ readiness has requirements the preparation of a SESA and an ESMF, 
mostly they prepare institutional and social grounding for safeguards. 
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control of the General Direction of Climate Change, Desertification and Hydrological 
Resources of the MINAM.  
Research and readiness of Peruvian reference levels started between 2013 and 2014, it was 
nationally socialized by the end of 2015 and, “a day before Christmas Eve” –as said by 
Claudia Ochoa (personal communication, February 7, 2018) - in December, 29, submitted 
to the UNFCCC. Respective observations arrived in august, 2016; they were answered and 
re-submitted the same month. Finally, the formal UN compliance was received in 
November, 2016. 
By the date, MRV requirement is not ready. It implicates an august inter-institutional 
coordination that needs to be activated. It goes through Programa Bosques –as the focal 
point, CC Direction of MINAM, SERFOR, MINAGRI (National Agriculture Ministry). In 
lower degree, it is also required the participation of other institutions like OSINFOR 
(Supervisor Organism of Forest Wood Sources) and SENACE (National Service of 
Environmental Certification) –which by this year is expected to receive competencies to 
regulate agricultural and forestry projects. Peruvian safeguards system must be designed 
with a unified, organized and coherent approach, towards the fulfillment of the social 
requirements that this fund demands. 
Safeguards system readiness is not yet ready either. The REDD+ Safeguards Roadmap 
(MINAM, 2017a) indicates that 4 indicative activities must be adopted: (1) interpretation 
and conceptualization of safeguards, (2) process of designing and implementing a SIS, (3) 
processes of participation and capacity building of actors, and (4) a process of 
communication of information to the UNFCCC. 
According to Grupo REDD+ Perú (2017) and M. Ruiz (Personal Communication, June 6, 
2018), in the way to accomplish the SIS (the second activity of the mentioned roadmap), 3 
products have been already done: SESA (Social Environmental Strategic Assessment), 
REDD+ actions, ESMF (Environmental Social Management Framework); the only 
product left to do is the informatics system (SIS) itself.  
A more detailed analysis of the institutional architecture on REDD+ in Peru will be 
presented in chapter 3, on the state of Forest Governance in Peru.  
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2.3.1. Nested Approach 
Peru opted for a nested approach to implement REDD+, which was presented jointly with 
other countries to the SBSTA in 2007. The nested-approach MRV system, with the forest-
emissions reference levels, was implemented at regional and local levels (MINAM, 2017b) 
in such a way that it allows accounting for GHG emissions and removals at a national level. 
In this context, many countries are carrying out Early Actions at the local and sub-national 
levels. The nested approach allows encouraging this type of early exercises and inserting 
them in broader schemes, whether they are held in sub national governments of the 
national government, once these are fully developed. 
Today, the concept of "nesting" sub national REDD+ activities in broader national 
frameworks is frequently mentioned in related discussions. Countries such as Peru and 
Guatemala have proposed a nested scheme for REDD+ and have begun to implement it 
(Conservación Internacional, 2009).  
Under this approach, in 2011, 35 projects were reported in Peru, 34 at the stage of design 
and 1 in underway (Che Piu & García, 2011); in the current year, 30 projects were reported, 
of which 25 are underway, 2 are planned, 2 have already been completed and 1 has been 
abandoned. According to ID-RECCO (International Database on REDD+ Projects 
linking Economic, Carbon and Communities data), the ultimate database for REDD+ 
projects around the world, Peru is among the countries with the largest number of projects 
(Simonet et al., 2018). In 8 years, forest area conserved by REDD+ projects jumped from 
0.98 million hectares in 2011 to 7.03 million hectares in 2018. 
3. Forest Governance 
In the first place, governance can be described as the mechanisms, processes and 
institutions that determines how power is exercised, how decisions are made on matters of 
public interest, and how citizens articulate their interests, exercise their rights and fulfill 
their obligations and mediate their differences (Sangita, 2002). 
Despite this, Forest Governance is still a generic term and is used to describe the way in 
which people and organizations govern and regulate forests. Better definitions are those 
that mention the way rights and benefits of forests are assigned and accessed, including 
planning, monitoring and control of their use, management and conservation (FAO, 2010). 
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Good forest governance emerges as a change in the vision of the functions and 
responsibilities of the Government vis-à-vis other stakeholders. It is a change from the old 
style of governance where the central government champions a new conceptual 
understanding in which several actors are the ones who co-govern.  
The improvement of forest governance facilitates the implementation of policies and 
instruments for deforestation avoidance. In this sense, analyzing in detail what this means 
allows an even more effective refinement. The following paragraphs will describe the three 
principles on which forest governance is based, and on which this study assumes that 
without full compliance of them, no environmental policy will be effective.  
Forest governance leads to the harmonization of policies and the strengthening of the 
institutional framework, norms and information of the forestry sector with the 
participation of public and private actors. 
Participation 
Participation not only implies that every stakeholder must be effectively incorporated into 
decision-making, but also included in the implementation and evaluation processes. It also 
implies that informed and organized actors can actively intervene, directly or indirectly, in 
the design, formulation, implementation and evaluation of public policies (FAO & 
PROFOR, 2011, p. 15). This participation must occur according to the legal framework 
and established procedures. It must be considered that the right to participate in public 
affairs is a human right. 
Transparency 
Transparency represents the government's willingness to disclose its actions and be subject 
to the scrutiny of those administered. It is a two-way road: on the one hand, the 
government makes information public, corresponding to its actions and decisions; on the 
other, the citizen may request it when he considers it necessary (FAO & PROFOR, 2011, 
p. 16). Then, adequate mechanisms are required for the dissemination of government 
actions and for the attention to the requirements of the administrated11.  
Accountability 
                                                          
11
 In Peru there is a legal framework on transparency and access to public information. In the case of 
REDD+, the Cancun Agreement’s safeguards for REDD+ indicate that transparent national forest 
governance structures must be estsablished. 
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Accountability demands that all public structure respond for the decisions and actions they 
perform in the exercise of power delegated. It is based on the responsibility that political 
actors have towards all members of society for their actions and decisions. This requires 
that such decisions and actions comply with the current legal framework and respond to 
the genuine public interest (FAO & PROFOR, 2011, p. 16). 
3.1. REDD+ Governance in Perú 
As mentioned, the causes of deforestation are diverse and categorized as direct or indirect. 
The prioritization of the indirect causes of deforestation is complicated, since it represents 
structural factors that are difficult to identify locally and generally act together, but their 
origins and effects can be identified in the way forest policies are implemented.  
In this sense, forest governance is an enabling condition for forests conservation. Practical 
experience and several empirical evaluations of programs to reduce deforestation and 
degradation indicate that the implementation of REDD+ requires the existence of a 
governance structure at national and regional levels, allowing the application of 
management instruments (Young & Bird, 2015).  
Precisely, one of the means of implementation of the ENBCC to achieve quality of 
institutions and good governance is based on the reinforcement and articulation of regional 
and local forest governance to control deforestation and forest degradation and to 
reinforce awareness of forest conservation (MINAM, 2015b, p. 52). 
In addition, the ENBCC emphasizes how political and institutional factors (mainly, lack of 
policy coherence, weak forest governance and institutional coordination) directly affects 
economic factors (undervaluation of forests, opportunity costs of competitive uses), land 
use and sustainable technological-conversion (limited technical assistance, use of 
technology, and poor access to credit) and interact frequently with different actors (mainly 
small farmers and large agro industrial landowners, on the margins of forests to cause 
deforestation and forest degradation). 
Likewise, Peru have sought to create an institutional framework for REDD+, which would 
be based on the Climate Change Strategy, the Inter-institutional Group for climate change 
management, the National Forestry System and the R-PP document (MINAM, 2015b). 
Table 2, extracted from the R-PP (MINAM, 2017b), presents the state and non-state 
entities whose competences are linked to the development of REDD+. 
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Table 2: State and Non-state Entities Linked to REDD+ 
Institution Dependencies12 
MINAM  - General Directions:  
Dirección General de Cambio. 
Climático, Desertificación y Recursos Hídricos 
(DGCCDRH). 
Dirección General de Ordenamiento Territorial 
(DGOT). 
Dirección de Evaluación, Valoración y 
Financiamiento del Patrimonio Natural 
(DGEVFPN). 
Programa Nacional de Conservación de Bosques 
para la Mitigación del Cambio Climático 
(PNCBMCC). 
- Servicio Natural de Áreas Naturales Protegidas 
(SERNANP). 
- Organismo Estatal de Fiscalización Ambiental 
(OEFA). 
MINAGRI  - Dirección General Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre 
(DGFFS). 
- Dirección General de Infraestructura Hidráulica. 
(DGIH). 
- Dirección General de Asuntos Ambientales 
Agrarios (DGAAA). 
- Programa de Desarrollo Productivo Agrario Rural 
(AGRORURAL). 
- Programa de Compensaciones para la 
Competitividad (AGROIDEAS). 
- Instituto Nacional de Innovación Agraria (INIA). 
- Sistema Nacional Forestal (SINAFOR). 
Provincial Governments - Unidades de Gestión Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre. 
- Dirección Regional Agraria (DRA). 
- Gerencias Regionales de Recursos Naturales y 
Gestión del Medio Ambiente (GRRNGMA). 
Ministry of Economy - Unidad de Cambio Climático within the Dirección 
General de Asuntos de Economía Internacional, 
Competencia y Productividad. 
Ministry of External Affair Chancellery 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers - Organismo de Supervisión de los Recursos 
Forestales (OSINFOR). 
- Centro Nacional de Planeamiento Estratégico 
(CEPLAN). 
Ministry of Culture Vice Ministerio de Interculturalidad. 
Ministry of Energy and Mines  
Ministry of Transports and Communications  
Ministry of Foreign Commerce and Tourism  
Technical Group for REDD+ of the National CC 
Commission. 
 
Peruvian REDD+ Group  
REDD+ Indigenous Platform  
Committee of Forest Management and Wildlife  
Municipal Environmental Commissions  
                                                          
12 Most of the names in the Dependencies section will be exposed in Spanish in order to maintain fidelity 
with Peruvian institutions. The names that are used subsequently in the content of this work will appear 
translated in parenthesis. Also, the cases in which no dependencies are presented is because, in fact, there are 
none, the institution itself represents the articulator. 
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Regional Environmental Commissions  
Environmental Funds FONAM 
NGO’s  
Firms  
Universities and Research Centers  
Peasant Groups  
Indigenous Representation Organizations  
Source: (MINAM, 2017b) 
 
In terms of the necessary legal and institutional arrangements, since June 2015, Perú has a 
specific regulation of REDD+ with the enactment of Law No. 30215 (Law on Mechanisms 
for Payment for Ecosystem Services), which opened a clearer picture of what will be the 
regulation of ecosystems’ services in the country. 
Likewise, what REDD+ seeks is to reduce deforestation and forest degradation in a 
multisectoral and inter institutional manner ; it is precisely for this reason that major forest 
powers have been transferred to regional governments (such as the granting of rights over 
their respective forest and wildlife resources, and the approval of forest management 
plans). 
It should be noted that the application of laws for the forestry sector has been mainly 
oriented towards the traceability of timber production, which includes pre-established 
mechanisms and procedures that allow tracing (historically) the location and trajectory of 
the product, from the origin throughout the production chain, using various tools 
(SERFOR, 2016). 
3.2. REDD+ Forest Governance Studies 
A review of the most relevant studies was carried out, in order to know what has been 
produced departing from the Forest Governance approach on REDD+. However, given 
the enormous amount of literature available in the last years linked to REDD+, a selective 
mention of researches was held, in order to focus on those that are linked more precisely to 
the goal of the thesis. It is worth mentioning that the theoretical focuses and geographical 
scales in which each of the documents and papers had shaped their objects of study are 
varied. 
This section has been divided initially under a geographical criterion with a comprehensive 
thematic scale. In the second place, some of the main studies carried out in Peru will be 
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mentioned. Finally, in order to have references of perception studies of REDD+ forest 
governance -evaluation that is also carried out in this research-, the last section will address 
the ones carried out at global and national levels. 
3.2.1. Broad Forest Governance Studies and REDD+ 
The publication “Voz y opción: Abriendo la puerta a la democracia ambiental” (Joseph Foti, 2008) 
made a cross-country research -including Peru- in order to analyze the progress of 
environmental democracy making use of the principles of governance (transparency, 
participation and accountability). It was concluded that states have advanced in terms of 
legal policies, land-rights and opportunities to access information; however, the progress 
has been very slow, which demonstrates the enormous challenge of making 
transformational changes towards an effective commitment to climate democracy. 
Anne Larson, a well-known researcher in REDD+ issues, currently working for the Center 
for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) in Peru, conducted a study with a focus on 
land-tenure (Larson et al., 2013). Through an analysis of discourses, the main goal was to 
evaluate how REDD+ acts as a threat or opportunity for local rights and land tenure. 
Among the results, albeit the program can foster land securing for local communities, the 
state remains in a contradiction between discourse and action. Similarly, Myers et al. (2018) 
conducted a research in Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Tanzania and Vietnam. It sought to 
explain why conservation projects such as REDD+ failed to include notions of 
representative justice. According to the paper, this failure generates messiness in the systems 
and principles of governance within local communities, delegitimizing the essence of the 
projects. 
Likewise, Seymour et al. (2018) carried out a national and sub-national review of cases in all 
countries with REDD+ projects, in order to systematize the main lessons of what was 
experienced up to 2014. The study concluded that the program represents an option to 
reinforce forest governance in terms of transparency and public participation like no other 
conservation program has done before, but major changes will only be seen after the last 
phase of the program (Results-Based Payments) is activated. A similar conclusion was 
given by Larson and Petkova (2011), by saying that the positive reform opportunities that 
REDD+ offers can only be achieved if the government and the international community 
strengthen their investment in institutional purposes now; this effort today would 
determine the success of the program in a long-term. 
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3.2.2. REDD+ Forest Governance Studies in Peru 
The studies on forest governance linked to REDD+ in Peru have been carried out under 
different perspectives, objectives and geographical scales. They can be divided into three 
large groups, (1) comprehensive, (2) institutional and (3) legal. 
Two studies, one made by Che Piu and García (2011) and the other by Che Piu and 
Menton (2013), overview the governance situation of REDD+ in Peru under a fairly 
comprehensive focus. Both strategically assess the main stakeholders, power levels, 
implementation processes, challenges and opportunities that the program maintains in the 
country. These studies offered an integral reflection on the needs and impacts of REDD+ 
in Perú. They share the idea that there is weakness in the institutional architecture linked to 
forests processes, as well as in the management capacities and in the levels of transparency 
and access to information. 
Another two studies analyze various projects carried out in Peru using an institutional and 
comparative perspective, one and another in the central jungle. The first one done by 
Hajek et al. (2011) is a comparative assessment of 12 projects in the south-eastern Amazon 
region that seeks to understand the possible collisions and links that may arise between 
forms of government suggested by REDD+ and the existing emerging architectures of 
local forest management. The second study done also by Scriven (2012), examines existing 
institutional arrangements of local communities in the central jungle region (Yanachaga-
Chemillen National Park’s buffer zone) and how state and non-state actors cope with the 
change in land use.  
Again, the spots of coincidence point to the institutional weakness of the government's 
forest management and, consequently, the importance of generating hybrid (where the 
interests of all types of actors are included) and related (observed in the REDD+ credit 
value chain a form of social and environmental innovation) institutional logics. 
In parallel, three studies deal with the legal aspect of REDD+. First, at a very early stage of 
REDD+ in the country, Capella and Sandoval Díaz (2010) design a normative and 
institutional proposal for the application of REDD (without the plus element) projects in 
Peru, identifying at the same time some examples of forest areas where they could be 
implemented. The second study done by Peña Alegría (2014) carefully describes how 
Peruvian legislation understands forest resources in REDD+ projects, as well as the carbon 
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market and its legislative possibilities to give the program a logical position under the 
national legal framework. Finally, Wieland Fernandini and Sousa (2015) makes an overview 
of the distribution of powers through the different levels of forestry-responsible 
institutions, land use, and how this legal-institutional landscape could affect the 
implementation of REDD+ in Peru. 
The abovementioned studies share the idea that Peru has implemented REDD+ as an 
attractive initiative to avoid the liberation of CO2 emissions and at the same time to 
comply with its commitments on climate change. However, its legal framework must be 
carefully observed as it still has serious deficiencies that deserve special treatment. One of 
the main concerns which should have priority is the problem of ownership of carbon 
storage, given the historical conflicts between state and indigenous communities. 
While this thesis is written, the bylaw (rules of procedure) of the Framework Law on 
Climate Change is being socialized by MINAM through regional working groups, research 
groups and indigenous organizations. The purpose of this process is to clarify the 
institutional and functional framework for REDD+. It is expected that after this process, 
the program will be fully appropriated by those who are related to the reduction of 
emissions and removals of GHGs in forests nationwide at every scale of governance. 
3.2.3. Forest Governance Perception Studies 
Eight perception studies have been identified regarding REDD+ forest governance, 
conducted between 2012 and 2018 in countries of Central Africa and Asia-Pacific, such as 
Indonesia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Panama, Zambia and Peru. 
Without trying to deepen in their specific methodologies, the central concern of these 
studies focused on collecting perceptions directly from involved stakeholders. They could 
be divided into three categories, corresponding to the scope of analysis, the quality of 
forest governance, clarity on REDD+ concepts and the challenges and opportunities of 
REDD+. In this case, we will use a geographical criterion to detail the objectives and 
results of these studies. 
Two studies were done in Papua New Guinea with the goal of assessing the quality of 
REDD+ forest governance. The first, carried out by Leggett and Lovell (2012), under the 
exposition of ethnographic information, has reported an asymmetry in power relations 
between local elites and landowners. This followed in communities’ distrust upon the 
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project and developed local incapacity to get involved in a legitimate way, so that there was 
no credibility in its implementation and the value of the carbon credit was at risk.  
The second study done by Cadman et al. (2016) and developed in Papua New Guinea, was 
done within a comparative framework with Nepal. Through online surveys and workshops 
with stakeholders, 11 governance principles were assessed. Respondents from both 
countries rated under Likert scale the principles of inclusiveness and resources with the 
highest and lowest values of effectiveness; likewise, principles assigned with the highest 
priority of application were those mentioned above, as well as transparency and 
accountability. It is highlighted that certain clusters of principles may be more suitable for 
assessing and applying good REDD+ governance, since the study shows complex results 
and multiple linkages.  
Meanwhile, two evaluations were conducted on the African continent in 2014 and 2018. 
The first study focused on evaluating the discourses on adaptation and mitigation, as well 
as the level of understanding of different climate concepts related to REDD+ by 138 
stakeholders (Tiani et al., 2014). They “…are struggling to understand the key concepts of 
climate change” (Tiani et al., 2014, p. 10), this leads to the individualization of the 
understanding of the basic elements and goals of REDD+, which allow to conclude that a 
diversity of perceptions would generate the impossibility of a successful implementation of 
the program. The second study applied in Zambia, was done by Musole Kwenye and 
Chunda-Mwango (2018). Six forest governance principles were evaluated in 3 communities, 
where a very low level of perception of the quality of governance was evidenced, especially 
for accountability and equity principles. It is concluded that the necessary reforms to this 
type of results should not be confined to the directly forest area, but to sectors that could 
have indirect responsibilities, such as the justice system, production or agriculture 
ministries. 
The next two studies have been conducted in countries from the Asia-Pacific region -
composed of responses from an undetermined number of countries (T. Cadman & 
Maraseni, 2012) and in Panama (Peterson St-Laurent et al., 2013).  
The first study seeks to evaluate 11 indicators on the quality of forest governance between 
two groups of countries, the Global South and the Global North. This comparison is 
observed through 3 identical surveys, distributed over three consecutive years. This 
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division, according to the authors, could help to suggest what perception donor countries 
would have in relation to recipient countries. In this sense, one of the most outstanding 
results of the work is the high quality rating of the governance given by the Global South, 
different from that given by the Global North. This could indicate that the countries 
receiving REDD+ financing are more optimistic of the program than their counterparts. It 
stands out that the great majority of the results are located in the middle ranges of 
perception, being the great exception the principle of inclusion or participation. 
The study made in Panama focuses on the evaluation of perceptions in the so-called 
"colonists farmers", which in other words are those farmers who have migrated from other 
cities to "colonize" forest areas. As mentioned in previous chapters, one of the main 
drivers of deforestation is shifting cultivation, which deforests in small plots. This research 
acquires greater importance for this thesis, given that the respondents are 'responsible' for 
deforestation; similar pattern is met by the "colonists" in Peru. 
The results reflect a clear difference in perception by types of organization. Respondents 
from the government perceive REDD+ as a possibility to improve the legal forest system, 
control over foreground resources and a stable funding opportunity. While the farmers 
("colonists") express their concern about the distribution of benefits and the potential 
negative consequences that the program can bring in terms of land titling. It is concluded 
that the perceptions vary according to the geopolitical origin and cultural origin that the 
social group or the respondent possesses. 
In Peru, only one perception study on forest governance linked to REDD+ has been 
carried out, done by Che Piu (2014) and mainly focusing to Civil Society, since 70% of the 
participants in the survey indicated that they were non-governmental actors (civil society, 
indigenous peoples, entrepreneurs, etc.), the remaining 30% was identified as Government 
actors. Results showed a predominantly negative perception in terms of transparency and 
access to information, and slightly positive in terms of participation. The author suggests 
that transparency and access to information is an area in which greater efforts are still 
required to improve the governance of REDD+ in Peru. 
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4. Evidencing REDD+ Incapacity through the Forest Governance Approach 
This chapter explains the problem and the question that arises from the information 
previously presented, as well as the tools and process held to answer it.  
4.1. The Problem and the Question 
As reported, deforestation rates in global and Peruvian tropical forests shows increasing 
trends. During 2001-2014 period, 1,653,129 ha of Amazonian humid forests were 
deforested, at an average annual rate of 118,080,10 ha (MINAM, 2016a; Finer et al., 2018).   
To address this problem, Peruvian government has leveraged enormous efforts to stop the 
rampant disappearance of forests and its drivers (MINAM, 2010b, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 
2017b), one of the most popularized tools for it is REDD+. It was seen as a potential 
quadruple win, forests loss alleviation, co-benefits for poverty reduction and households 
development, improved forest governance and biodiversity conservation (CIFOR, 2008), 
but after more than 10 years of the program’s implementation, as deforestation rates 
indicates, the objective has not been achieved.  
It is true that the country is yet not in the phase in which communities are financially 
rewarded for avoided deforestation (Results-Based Payments). But the unprecedented 
finance delivered to the national readiness phase, initiated 10 years ago, as well as the 
institutional arrangements that have been done -including legal frameworks, forests 
monitoring and safeguards systems design- could have triggered some kind of changes in 
forest loss trends, but no such thing has happened. 
Therefore, the question that this thesis intends to answer rises alone: Why deforestation 
has not been reduced in Perú, after 10 years of REDD+ implementation? For this purpose, 
since this program is not an impartial conservation project, but a functioning form of 
forest policy that owes to a global environmental government process already presented, 
forest governance13 will be used as a point of departure and theoretical approach to give an 
answer. Based on the literature review and primary data collection, it is expected to 
evidence gaps in the three governance principles within REDD+ implementation in Peru.   
                                                          
13
 Understood as the capacities and actions in which institutions regulates and administers forests (FAO, 
2018b, p. 69) 
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This research brings the governance issue to the fore, by asking the very implementers and 
stakeholders their perceptions about the Peruvian reality of the governance principles 
regarding REDD+.  
4.2. Methodological Framework 
The process of collecting primary information was based on the use of virtual surveys and 
interviews. During January and February, a field trip to Peru was done in order to make 
direct contact with the mapped institutions and conduct on-site interviews with the 
specialists who agreed to meet, as well as to attend the meetings of the Peruvian REDD+ 
group. 
4.2.1. Implementation of the Virtual REDD+ Perception Survey  
A survey was applied to a sample of individuals from the most relevant institutions. The 
purpose was to assess the state of governance of the national REDD+ process in Peru, 
mainly from the point of view of Civil Society, understood as citizens who act in an 
organized manner to make decisions in the public sphere. These citizens are considered to 
have interests or rights that may be negatively or positively affected by REDD+ activities. 
In this sense, we understand perception as the process by which one selects, organizes and 
interprets stimuli, to give meaning to something in a subjective, selective and temporal way. 
Different stakeholders may have different interests, so their experiences of participation, 
transparency and accountability in REDD+ processes may generate different 
interpretations and predispositions.  
The perceptions of the respondents should not be judged as correct or incorrect, but rather 
as the opinion of the actors, and therefore valid. They are an indicative reference of the 
concerns and interests of the actors, and they provide us with an opportunity to begin 
attending them. 
The survey was elaborated in Google Forms (Annex 1), it has 11 questions of which 10 are 
obligatory and 1 is optional (the last one), these asks for the respondents e-mail address to 
subsequently receive the systematized survey’s data. It is divided in 3 sections, (1) General 
Information, (2) Forest Governance and (3) Contact. 
For questions 8, 9 and 10 a minimally modified Likert scale was used (totally disagree, 
disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree and totally agree) due to the addition of a sixth 
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option (none). The propositions were expressed in a positive way to avoid that the survey 
could lead to negative perceptions.  
4.2.1.1. General Information  
This section is composed by 4 questions regarding gender (closed to 1 option), kind of 
organization (9 options including 1 free to fill, open to select a maximum of 3 options), 
region of work (closed to 1 option), and the experience in REDD+ (closed to 1 option and 
filter question). The latter question worked as a filter, no experience in REDD+ was 
reported, no further questions of the program were asked, section 2 was skipped and the 
respondent was automatically directed to section 3.  
The reason for this exception was because the survey sought to collect REDD+ forest 
governance perceptions strictly from individuals with a minimum of experience on the 
program to enhance data legitimacy. It is worth to anticipate that only 1 of the 40 
respondents reported no experience. 
4.2.1.2. Forest Governance14  
The second section addresses forest governance perceptions on REDD+ and it is divided 
in its three principles or sub sections, (2.1) Participation, (2.2) Transparency and (2.3) 
Accountability; with 4, 1 and 1 questions, respectively. The reason why there are more 
questions in the Participation sub section is because, in order to interpret the level of 
participation, it is imperative to know which are the national participation processes, spaces 
and forms where respondents have incurred; each of these 3 elements gives important 
information about how stakeholders relate to REDD+ and explains the kind of actions 
that organizations and individuals have had with it.  
The selection of these three governance principles requires a justification, since other 
studies consider more governance principles that have not been included for this work. On 
the one hand, it is clear that governance is not limited to these three principles and it could 
not be concluded that if the perceptions are not positive, there is no governance; the 
selection of the principles chosen for this research are aimed at evaluating mainly the level 
of participation of mapped stakeholders in the different processes, spaces and forms. Also, 
it was considered that participation is a historical problem in Peru and is currently part of 
the main demands of indigenous representation organizations and civil society groups, as 
                                                          
14
 To ease the comprehension of each principle, a short definition is presented in the header. 
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well as much of the efforts of the Peruvian state to improve what it understands by 
Governance (SERFOR, 2016). 
For their part, the principles of transparency and accountability act as linked characteristics 
to participation that provide strength and meaning to the operation of the first principle. 
These three principles, precisely, act as interdependent indicators of the legitimacy of the 
state as they speak of the structure and processes of action related to what is generated by 
REDD+. Other governance indicators propose, for example, "substantive values" 
(Buchanan & Keohane, 2006), which include principles like human rights or happiness; 
while the latter allude to moral characteristics of governance, the chosen ones point towards 
performative factors of governance. 
On the other hand, the possibility of including a greater number of performative indicators of 
good forest governance was limited to the capacity to gather information. Surveying from 
abroad and virtually limits the number of responses that can be received, so it was decided 
to design a concise and direct survey, following, as stated above, the same principles that 
the government conceives what is good governance. 
Also, the options proposed for questions 5, 6 and 7 were carefully selected after reviewing 
official documents (MINAM, 2015a, 2017a, 2018b) and previous similar studies (Leggett & 
Lovell, 2012; Che Piu, 2014; Atmadja & Sills, 2016), based on the frequency and 
importance attributed to them, but they are certainly not the only ones. 
Question 5 addresses the formal national processes in which the respondent has 
participated to implement REDD+ in Perú. 5 options were originally proposed, including 1 
free to fill (limited to choose one option). To ensure question’s clearness, a specific 
description was stated under the question:”f you have participated in more than one, choose the 
process that you think has contributed the most”.  
Question 6 addresses the spaces of participation or platforms where respondents have 
incurred. 7 options were originally proposed including 1 free to fill (limited to choose 3 
options). Question 7 addresses the ways in which respondents has participated, this could 
be done in a passive (consulting information, attending meetings, participating in 
workshops) or active ways (elaborating documents or participating in political discussions). 
This previous two-folded categories are not presented in the survey, but used for the 
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systematization stage. Question 8 requests for the respondent’s perception on the 
participation principle.  
In the same way, questions 9 and 10 directly request the respondent’s perceptions on 
transparency and accountability, respectively.  
The last section has a single question related to the email address, in case the respondent 
wishes to receive the systematized information of the study. 
4.2.2. Sampling Strategy  
The process to achieve sample’s representativeness among REDD+ relevant organizations 
in Peru was held in 3 phases (organization’s mapping, categorization and liaison) and 
followed a non-probabilistic method or sampling by convenience, used when an online 
survey is leaved open to be filled by, in this case, the mapped actors and institutions, as well 
as the individuals who were encouraged to do so by the firsts. Non-probabilistic sampling 
was also used because of the available time and financing resources. 
Next, the process carried out to select the sample of respondents will be detailed. 
A possible problem with this method is that it is not possible to determine the probability 
with which each respondent has the possibility of being included in the sample, making it 
difficult to carry out statistical inferences. However, as mentioned by Fricker (2012, p. 200) 
this type of sampling can be used in research in other ways, such as for the development of 
hypotheses or to define ranges of alternatives, precisely what is intended in this study, 
taking into account that the objects of analysis are perceptions.  
Mapping of Organizations  
Who has been taken as a sample? The literature review produced an overview of the 
institutions involved and potentially involved in Peruvian REDD+ arena. Several kinds of 
documentation was assessed, considering peer-reviewed papers and institutional reports 
(Hajek et al., 2011; Che Piu, 2014; Menton et al., 2014; Wieland Fernandini & Sousa, 2015; 
Kowler et al., 2016), official documents (MINAM, 2015a; Grupo REDD+ Perú, 2017) and 
attendance records from socialization workshops of forests policies directed by Futuro 
Sostenible (2018), a consultant organization contracted by MINAM’s Programa Bosques, as 
part of the readiness phase of REDD+ during 2015, 2016 and 2017.  
Categorization of Organizations 
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Based on this information, 8 categories of organizations were determined as a first step to 
visualize to whom the survey should be addressed. Categorization took into account the 
following kinds of criteria, (1) the sector from which institutions come from (public, 
private and civil society) and geographical scope (international, and national). A detailed list 
of the institutions is presented in Annex 2.  
Table 3: Amount of Organizations by Category 
 
Government 20 
Research 6 
Civil Society 2 
Indigenous Representative Organization 17 
National NGO 14 
International NGO 27 
Donor and/or Technical Cooperation 
Consultant 
TOTAL 
21 
5 
112 
Source: Own preparation, based information from multiple publications (Hajek et al., 2011; Che Piu, 2014; Menton et al., 
2014; AIDER, 2015; Wieland Fernandini & Sousa, 2015; Kowler et al., 2016; Grupo REDD+ Perú, 2017; Futuro 
Sostenible, 2018). 
 
Liaison with Organizations 
After having systematized and categorized the organizations, the e-mails were collected 
from institutional web pages, attendance records and personal contacts. In order to request 
the institutions to fill the virtual survey, a model of letter (Annex 3) was made to 
standardize the petition and subsequently send it to the contacts. 
Taking into account the extreme difficulty to engage with all the Peruvian organizations 
involved in REDD+ in such a short time, two kinds of non-probability sampling types 
were needed to achieve quantitative homogeneity between organization’s samples15. In a 
first stage (between March 24 and May 24, 2018), Snowball and Judgment Sampling were used, 
since the letter of request asked for the individual to fill and share the form among contacts 
with REDD+ experience.  
By the end of May, the number of answers of the organization’s categories did not reach 
homogeneity and it was decided to move on to a second stage of the survey sending, in 
order to equal the categories with less answers to the one that got the most, which was the 
                                                          
15
 Representativeness in non-probabilistic samples is usually established according to quotas that are 
proportional to the population of each sub group. But, given that the surveys collected information of a 
subjective nature, in this case, representativeness is determined by the quantitative homogeneity among sub 
groups. 
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Indigenous Representative Organization category (5 answers). Between May 24 and June 
30 of the same year, Judgment sampling was used to equal the number of answers from the 7 
remaining organizations, by doing direct phone calls to institutions from the mapped 
organizations and formally asking to answer the quantity of surveys needed.16  
4.2.3. Interviews  
To complement the data collected from the surveys, 3 non-structured interviews were done 
to 2 Peruvian REDD+ consultant and researcher, and 1 Portuguese REDD+ researcher 
(via Skype), in relation to the subjects in which the interviewees were specialized.  
Likewise, in order to present the thesis research and ask the specialists to interview them, a 
model of letter (Annex 4) was made to standardize the petition. The topics discussed were 
not exclusively about forest governance, but also about REDD+ related issues as presented 
in the discussed subjects of table 5.  
  
                                                          
16
 The organizations that were contacted at this stage were randomly selected using Microsoft Excel Sort 
Range Randonmly tool. 
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Table 4: Detail of Interviews and Meetings 
 
Date of 
Interview or 
Meeting 
Name 
(Duration of 
meeting) 
Organization, 
Position and Area of 
Expertise 
Subjects discussed 
29 Jan, 2018 Claudia Ochoa 
(1h35min) 
- Independent, 
- Consultant, 
- Legal specialist on 
issues of forests, 
climate change and 
renewable energy. 
International climate agreements, Peruvian 
REDD+ evolution, jurisdictional and nested 
approaches, Brazilian REDD+. 
23 May, 2018 Maria 
Vasconcelos 
(35min) 
- Instituto Superior de 
Agronomia (ISA) 
- PhD, REDD+ 
Project Manager, 
- Geographical 
information and 
REDD+ international 
projects. 
Voluntary carbon markets, community’s 
incentives, social sensitization on conservation 
issues, non-carbon benefits for local 
involvement on REDD+, transparency, 
accountability, local institutional weakness, 
difficulties and motivations to implement 
REDD+. 
6 Jun, 2018 Mirko Ruiz 
(1h2min) 
- Conservation 
International – Peru 
(CI), 
- Program Officer, 
- Specialist in 
REDD+ Safeguards 
Systems. 
National safeguards elaboration process, forest 
governance situation in Peruvian arena. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
 
The virtual survey of perceptions regarding REDD+ Forest Governance (which in the 
Google form was titled as “Quick Perception Survey about REDD+ Governance in Peru”) was 
voluntarily filled by 40 individuals, during March and June of 2018. Its results will be 
presented following the same division established in the virtual form.  
At the same time, these sections will be used to include related content extracted from the 
interviews directed to the specialists. Subsequently, the information collected exclusively 
from the interviews will be presented. 
5.1. General Information of Survey’s Respondents 
Gender 
The virtual survey did not looked for a gender balanced sample, despite this, results close 
to parity can be observed, with 40% of the respondents reporting being women. The only 
type of organization with respondents from a single gender was Research, only with males.  
Chart 3: Question 1 (“Gender?”) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey  
 
Organizations by Categories 
An important condition to generate deductions from a representative sample of the 
relevant Peruvian organizations involved in REDD+ is to have the same number of 
respondents per category of organizations. As shown, 5 responses were obtained for each 
of the 8 types of mapped organizations. 
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 Chart 4: Question 2 (“What is the type of organization of which you are part?”) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey  
 
Region of Work 
Since REDD+ started to be implemented in Peru, organizations located at different 
regions and scales started to take part on it.   
Chart 5: Question 3 (“What is the region where you work?”) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey  
 
21 respondents, just over half of the total, reported to be working at a national level, 
followed by a group of 6 individuals who works in Lima, the Peruvian capital. 12 
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respondents correspond to the cluster of Amazonian regions (Ucayali, Amazonas -the 
Brazilian province-, San Martin and Madre de Dios). 
Gender distribution in relation to the region where the respondents works (question 3) also 
shows relevant differences, of the 21 individuals that reported working at a national level, 
only 6 were female; while the remaining group that worked at the regional level showed 
greater parity (10 women and 8 men). 
When looking closer to the responses of those who work at the national scale, the Peruvian 
REDD+ Group represents the most important participation space with 63%. As well as 
the totality of respondents from the Government, who also reported to work at the same 
scale. The cluster of the Amazonian regions, which gathers 12 respondents, is the space 
where 4 of the 5 respondents from the Indigenous Representation Organization works, -
the remaining one works in Lima. 
Experience on REDD+ 
Chart 6: Question 4 (“Do you have any experience in REDD+?”) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey  
 
Question 4 worked as a filter to confirm that the answers are legitimized by some kind of 
experience on REDD+. Only one male respondent from a Research organization who 
works in Amazonas, Brazil reported not to have any experience. 
Forest Governance 
The second section of the survey evaluates the perceptions of the governance principles 
regarding REDD+. Beyond this, 3 more questions were added in the participation 
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principle, in order to know the processes, spaces and forms in which the respondent 
incurred during his experience. 
Processes of Participation 
According to M. Ruiz (Personal Communication, June 6, 2018), REDD+ participation has 
been slowly incremental. In the early stage of the program, around 2007, the state did not 
have any roadmap to follow, stakeholder’s involvement was very limited and technical 
capacity was scarce even for MINAM, which only gained prominence and power over 
time.  
In general, the different national entities with forestry competences were not clear about 
the objective of the program, there were different visions and the financing was 
insufficient. The importance of being part of formal processes for the implementation of 
REDD+ in Peru not only resides in the political formality of including the population, but 
also in generating a kind of internalization of the benefits that arise from the conservation 
of forests carbon stocks and avoiding deforestation. Ruiz follows, there may be funding 
and political lobbying of the program, but if there is no real involvement of local and civil 
communities, there is no appropriation of the project and it loses its meaning. 
Chart 7: Question 5 (“What are the national REDD+ processes in which you have 
incurred?”) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey  
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In terms of the Peruvian formal processes, this question from the survey originally offered 
4 options, related to the processes of preparation and revision of the R-PP, FIP, SIS and 
the execution of Early Actions, which represent 87% of responses. The remaining 13% 
corresponded to 2 options added by respondents, Reference Levels development (3 
answers), “other” (1 answer) and 1 individual who reported not having participated in any 
process.  
33.3% of the responses report having participated in the REDD+ Early Actions, which 
indicates it is the current process with greater importance. Instead, processes such as the 
Development and/or Review of the R-PP (15.1%) and the Investment Plan for FIP 
(23.4%), which although in previous evaluations were the most important (Che Piu, 2014), 
today they show less attendance . 
13 of 15 respondents, who answered having participated in the R-PP and FIP, work mainly 
in Lima and at the National Level. This could indicate that such processes tend to be 
centralized in the capital and not in the Amazonian regions, where the national program or 
the REDD+ Early Actions are being executed. 
The voluntary –or private- market projects (as those tested in REDD+ Early Actions 
phase) deserve a separate mention given the level of relegation of the aspect of 
participation. In the experience of Maria Vasconcelos (Personal Communication, 23 May, 
2018), the VERRA protocol, which works as a MRV standard and was applied in projects 
in Africa, does not have very specific measures on the inclusion of local communities.  
For this protocol to be put into practice, only the technical part is required, unlike 
jurisdictional programs (such as the nested approach of Peru), which are implemented by 
the IDB (International Development Bank) or the FCPF and do have a requirement the 
implementation of safeguards systems and benefit sharing mechanisms. 
Spaces of Participation 
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Chart 8: Question 6 (“What are the participation spaces that you have incurred?”) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey  
72% of those surveyed indicate having participated in the Peruvian REDD+ group, 23% in 
some REDD+ regional platform, 20% in the REDD+ indigenous platform, 15% in 
technical, regional and municipal commissions, and 13% in other spaces.  
This question allowed to choose up to 3 options, 15 individuals chose more than one 
option (of which 5 individuals reported having participated simultaneously in the Peruvian 
REDD+ group and the Regional REDD+ platform). Other 5 alternative participation 
spaces were mentioned (13% of the responses) such as the MINAM Safeguards 
Committee, the FIP process committee (3) and a pilot project. 
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Forms of Participation 
Chart 9: Question 7 (“What have been the ways in which you have participated?”) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey  
 
The forms or mechanisms used by the participants of the survey to intervene in the 
REDD+ processes have a relatively homogeneous distribution. The most frequent form 
was the preparation of documents (32.1%), followed by technical workshops (23.1%), 
political discussion events (17.9%), informative meetings (15.4%) and consulting 
information (11.5%). Since this question also allowed choosing up to 3 options, the most 
frequent association (6 respondents) was the attendance to technical workshops with 
preparation of documents. 
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Perception of Participation 
Chart 10: Question 8 (“I believe that the REDD+ processes in which I have incurred have 
been participatory”) 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey  
 
60% of the respondents Agreed and Completely Agreed that their participation was taken 
into account, that is, that their participation has been effective. However, 31% of 
respondents reported that they neither agree or disagree, which indicates a high degree of 
uncertainty and does not allow to firmly conclude that the principle of participation is fully 
met17. This pattern of uncertainty coincides with other perception studies regarding 
REDD+ governance done in Africa and Central America (T. Cadman & Maraseni, 2012; 
Musole Kwenye & Chunda-Mwango, 2018). 
In terms of gender distribution, the proportion of men who consider REDD+ processes 
transparent is more than twice the proportion of women (18.8% versus 43.4%).  
If data is analyzed by type of organizations, it can be useful to generate two clusters of 
answers, one that groups the levels of Likert 1, 2 and 3 (the undecided, those who disagree 
and totally disagree, 15 answers), and a second that groups the levels 4 and 5, the ones that 
                                                          
17
 However, the neutral responses should not be understood as an impartial perception of the actors, but 
rather as a situation in which they cannot respond in any of the other two senses. 
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agree and completely agree (23 answers); the first cluster mainly contains individuals from 
the national and public sector (Civil Society, Government and Organizations of Indigenous 
Representation), while the second cluster mainly contains individuals from the international 
and private sector (National NGOs, Consultant and Donor Organizations and Technical 
Cooperation).  
This indicate that organizations of a public scope and national scale -grassroots 
communities and government respondents- do not consider that there is effective 
participation in REDD+, unlike organizations of private and international scale, who do 
perceive that the principle of participation in REDD+ governance is fully met. 
Perception of Transparency 
Chart 11: Question 9 (“I believe that the REDD+ processes in which I have participated 
has been transparent”) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey  
 
In relation to the principle of transparency, there is no clear trend towards any option. The 
group of respondents who strongly disagree and disagree (14) almost equals the group that 
agrees and completely agrees (13). As in the principle of participation, it is also a highlight 
the degree of uncertainty reflected in the 10 respondents who answered not agreeing or 
disagreeing with respect to whether the REDD+ processes in which they participated were 
transparent. 
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The most visible trends of transparency by type of organization show that all respondents 
from the government are in the cluster of answers from Likert scale level 4 and 5. On the 
other hand, in the cluster for levels 1, 2 and 3, we mainly find respondents from indigenous 
representation organization and consultants. 
In the interview with M. Ruiz (Personal Communication, June 6, 2018), the specialist stated 
that, despite REDD+ not being a transparent process, there is pressure from civil society 
to ask for information. In his experience, several times information has been requested to 
MINAM, in some cases, the waiting time exceeded one year of waiting. 
For M. Vasconcelos (Personal Communication, 23 May, 2018), the reason why there is no 
transparency in some private market projects is not because there is a will to hide or need 
to maintain power, but rather because there is a strong institutional and technological 
incapacity to guarantee it. Institutions are very weak and do not have organizational or 
archival capacities that allow transparency practices. 
Perception of Accountability  
Chart 12: Question 10 (“I believe that the REDD+ processes in which I have participated 
has been accountable”) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey  
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Although with slight differences, perception of transparency in REDD+ processes shows a 
negative trend. 44% of the answers indicate that they disagree and strongly disagree there is 
transparency, 21% agree there is, and a considerable 31% remains neutral or undecided. 
In terms of gender distribution of this perception, the proportion of men who consider 
REDD+ processes accountable is 5 times higher than that of women (34.7% versus 6.3%), 
in other words, female respondents tend to perceive REDD+ less accountable than men. 
The distribution of the answers in relation to the types of organizations shows that every 
respondent from the government perceive accountability in REDD+ processes. 
In relation to the region of work, the cluster of respondents working in Amazonian regions 
(12), with the exception of one answer, chose levels 1, 2 and 3 of the Likert scale, the same 
happens with those who work in Lima. Unlike those who reported working at the National 
level, they agree and fully agree that REDD+ processes are accountable. 
The Peruvian REDD+ group, the most frequent participation platform among 
respondents (72%), reported two times more disagreeing and completely disagreeing (12) 
than those who reported agreeing and completely agreeing, but always accompanied by a 
high degree of uncertainty verified in the group of those who do not agree or disagree (9). 
Contact 
Even though the survey was anonymous, the majority opted for the possibility to not 
identify them. 10 of the 40 respondents  prefer not to identify themselves by filling the 
email box, and 8 of them reported to be from private organizations, such as a consultant, 
international and national NGO and research -the remaining 2 answers where both from a 
civil society organization. 
One hypothesis for the absence in identification could reside in the fact that REDD+ is an 
active process and organizations are still working in the program, so participants ought to 
take special care of possible reactions among their peers by avoiding identified opinions. 
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6. Conclusive Remarks 
6.1. Participation without Accountability 
What is it that offers certainty for an environmental policy to benefit the population? 
According to the World Development Report (World Bank, 2017), the answer lies in 
effective governance, which -beyond socially legitimizing a policy- provides strength and 
certainty that this will have positive consequences on social and environmental well-being. 
But effective governance is met when population perceives that there is a minimum level of 
inclusion in decision-making, access to information and institutions that provide voice and 
accountability to society. These elements, clearly, are interdependent and operate under a 
complex dynamic of trade-offs. 
On the one hand, participation in Peru has been implemented and at the same time 
demanded insistently. One of the main examples of this occurred with the implementation 
of the law of the right to prior consultation to Indigenous Peoples issued in 2011. This 
generated an unprecedented national dialogue, where platforms of interaction between the 
different levels of government were held. Without doubt, for the country it was a big step 
in terms of climate inclusion. 
Likewise, the framework law on climate change has also generated a process of important 
dialogue at institutional and regional level through the "Participatory Process for the 
Elaboration of the Regulations of the Framework Law on Climate Change", which began 
on May 10 of this year (MINAM, 2018a). To date, a multi-stakeholder, multi-thematic and 
decentralized process, and subsequent validation and approval of the rules of procedure 
with social workshops continue to be applied. 
Accountability, on the other hand, is related to narratives of representation that a person or 
social group upholds over –in this case- the government, which, in some way, looks after 
the interests or provides protection to the group. In this point, Peru has a tradition of 
having a political system of representation in crisis, characterized by corrupt cadres 
entrenched mainly in the legislative powers and political parties.  
Even more, if it is about the governance and presence of the state in Amazonian regions, 
the situation of political representativeness is chronically absent. Both indigenous 
representation organizations and the remaining urbanized population which do not identify 
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with indigenous demands live politically and geographically isolated from what happens in 
the coastal region, where power is centralized.  
The results of the survey reflect this collision between absence and presence of said 
governance principles. In a context where the actors are part of the decisions, but nobody 
knows who is responsible for what, the population cannot find a voice in those who are 
supposed to represent them, the relationship between the population and the state is not 
horizontal and the decisions are not legitimate. 
This generates failed governance, where inclusion is an illusion. That is, if there is 
disagreement with any political process, the social group has no way to be heard, or even 
know that they can be and, finally, representation does not exist. Participation ends up 
being a mere formality and an action of moral entitlement that bureaucratically provides 
formal acceptance to the projects that are being implemented. 
As already mentioned in sub chapter 3.3.3, in the REDD+ forest governance perception 
studies review, similar results are observed in assessments carried out in Zambia (T. 
Cadman & Maraseni, 2012; Musole Kwenye & Chunda-Mwango, 2018) and slightly to the 
assessment done in Perú (Che Piu, 2014). 
In the case of Zambia, the principle with the highest level of perception was participation, 
while the principle of accountability almost equals the least perceived. This country’s 
institutional needs, despite being geographically and culturally far, are similar to those in 
Peru. The need to establish obligations in the authorities to respond to their actions, to take 
initiatives of representation and to generate horizontal relationships -not top-down-, is 
critical in both countries. There is no need to ask, already, why in both countries REDD+ 
is not working. 
A state that applies forest governance unsuccessfully and -even worst- pretends to be based 
on trust -where there is effective interaction between actors and policies are generated 
bottom-up- has high possibilities of generating top-down government relations. 
6.2. In Conservation, Motivation Matters (specially for Indigenous 
Communities) 
Organizations closest to the forest, those who knows it the most (Indigenous 
representation organization and civil society), that is, the organizations that should have the 
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highest participation, access to information and capacity to supervise the activities of the 
authorities, are the ones who least perceived them.  
Chart 13: Cumulative Perceptions of Governance Principles by Type of Organization) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Survey  
 
When comparing the accumulated perceptions of the three principles of governance, 
between indigenous organizations and the government, the difference is abysmal. There is 
a clear lack of confidence from the latter group and, consequently, a demotivation by 
REDD+. This indicates a huge communication gap and a challenge in terms of Peruvian 
forest governance.  
Civil society (in what concerns the respondents to the survey) also presents extremely low 
accumulated levels of perception among the three principles; even more than indigenous 
organizations if the option of neither agree or disagree is considered as a negative 
perception.  
It is important to mention that civil society organizations incur in participation spaces of 
much greater political incidence and institutional hierarchy, such as the Peruvian REDD+ 
Group, FIP Directive Committee, Development of the Investment Plan for FIP; unlike 
Indigenous representation organizations which mainly participates in REDD+ Indigenous 
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platforms, a space of participation that has no weight in the decisions of the high political 
level, no effective recognition in relation to the REDD+ Early Actions projects nor has 
participated with importance during the readiness phase18. 
Following this pattern, REDD+ is not on track to succeed. The good performance of this 
program, depends much more on political factors -related to the level of representation 
that forest user groups have in negotiation processes- than on technical ones (Lederer, 
2012). The capacities of political incidence should, at least, reflect a greater balance in their 
distribution upon types of organizations. 
6.3. Gender Disparity 
The results obtained by the survey related to the gender issue, demand a specific section. 
Gender disparities regarding perceptions of governance are worrisome. Results of the 
survey showed that female population perceives that REDD+ processes are two times less 
transparent and 5 times less accountable than for male population. This coincides with a 
series of sexist and exclusionary patterns found in other REDD+ assessments (Larson et 
al., 2018).  
An alternative interpretation of these results could be based on the fact that female 
respondents might be more aware of the lack of transparency and accountability, 
generating a gender-differentiated critical sense about the processes, at least more than 
male respondents. 
It is a global agreement, materialized in the SDGs (United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals) and Safeguards implementation, that the fight against climate change 
and the loss of forests must be an inclusive process. At the same time, there are critical 
concerns related to the level at which this inclusion takes women into account. 
REDD+ must be sensitive and responsive in its activities related to gender equity. The 
National Strategy on Climate Change, which provides the guidelines for REDD+ in Peru, 
recognizes as a means of implementation that the high vulnerability of poor populations 
and ‘groups at risk’ must be considered. For this, it is mentioned that a gender approach 
must be applied to deal with Climate Change and implemented in conservation projects, 
such as REDD+. 
                                                          
18
 This lack of consideration of indigenous platforms in the R-PP was strongly criticized by the World Bank 
and the Rainforest Alliance (Rainforest Foundation, 2010).  
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6.4. Has Peruvian REDD+ failed? 
As already mentioned, one of the pillars of REDD+ is the generation of the Safeguards 
System. This is designed to primarily protect the rights of indigenous communities, 
guaranteeing their access to participation (materialized in the Law of Prior Consultation to 
Indigenous or Native Peoples). This indispensable requirement is presented in the Cancun 
Agreement, ratified in the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ and represents the core of 
local governance guarantee for community forest user groups. 
This has been largely insisted on because, in effect, socio-environmental conflicts in 
tropical countries, especially those with a greater amount of forest cover, suffer from 
historical abuses in relation to the projects implemented inside their territories and, 
simultaneously, being subject to a series of conservation tests; the contemporary one is 
REDD+, but the previous one was Payment for Ecosystem Services, previously community-based 
conservation, and so we can do a retrospective of conservation fads (Redford et al., 2013), each 
one repackaging the previous. 
In Peru, socio-environmental conflicts represent 72.5% of the total national conflicts 
reported during 2017; this tendency is repeated throughout almost all republican life. 
Natural resources in Peru represent an issue of conflict, the government -as a focal point 
for REDD+- has a great responsibility both generating and solving them. 
In this sense, the national REDD+ program and the REDD+ Early Actions received a 
mandate they must respect, a specific framework to follow, which is the obligation to 
involve all stakeholders, especially indigenous communities.  
According to the results of the virtual survey on forest governance related to REDD+ 
applied to a representative sample of individuals with experience in the program, the 
respect for safeguards, specifically those related to transparency and accountability, that is, 
the pillars of forest governance, are not being successfully implemented to the most 
important stakeholders, forest dependent peoples. 
As reported by the interviewees, overtaking an evaluation of results at this point, without 
having the FCPF process active (Results-based Payments phase) can be risky.  
Still, for this research, already having 10 years of the program REDD+ in Perú, an 
evaluation is needed. The conclusion is that Peruvian REDD+ is a double failure. On the 
one hand, the inability to stop deforestation and degradation of forests is verified in the 
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first chapters by simply collecting the latest official data on national forest cover loss –rates 
of forest loss are incremental-; and on the other hand, the inability to implement the 
program under the principles of participation, transparency and accountability, verified by 
the results of the surveys and interviews conducted for this research. 
6.5. Future Considerations  
Opportunities from the sideline 
As results shows, indigenous peoples remain on the sidelines. All of them, since the 
preparation phase, must be properly informed and the necessary conditions must be 
provided for effective representation. However, the political process of REDD+ in Peru 
shows difficulties. 
The existence of spaces of participation such as the Peruvian REDD+ Group, the regional 
REDD+ Platform or the regional environmental commissions has not yet been adequately 
exploited. The agreements reached between MINAM and Indigenous Organizations done 
for the ENBCC, as well as with the REDD+ Group, represent an opportunity to enrich 
the program implementation processes and incorporate a wide variety of actors. 
The coordinated work between the Government, the private sector, civil society and 
indigenous organizations for the incorporation of their requests in the R-PP and the FIP 
can be reactivated as an important gesture that contributes to the rebuilding of trust 
between the abovementioned instances. 
A more determined effort is required from Peru to make REDD+ decision-making 
processes more transparent, as well as to make authorities accessible to all stakeholders.  
Additional Issues to be addressed by REDD+ 
There are sidelines issues that have not yet been addressed directly by REDD+ in Peru: the 
impact of REDD+ in biodiversity, the contabilization of forest fires in MRV systems and 
the consequences of a carbon market in Perú.  
The first is a critical issue for a mega diverse country like Peru, which is highly dependent 
on its biodiversity, whether for the livelihoods of its indigenous peoples or for many of its 
economic activities. However, this is not addressed with the necessary depth. In the future, 
more research will be required to understand not only the impacts of REDD+ on 
biodiversity but also on the importance of biodiversity to maintain carbon storage.  
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In that sense, the increase in forest fires, mainly due to the loss of humidity in certain 
periods, has increased the vulnerability of the forests. Efforts to prevent deforestation by 
human activities can be ruined by forest fires that can generate emissions that have been 
avoided for a long time and even high cost. This new risk is not being incorporated into 
the analysis and debate on REDD+ and, therefore, the necessary capacities to deal with it 
are not being incorporated either.  
Finally, the incorporation of the carbon market that comes with REDD+ is being accepted 
without further discussion, AIDESEP leads almost alone the concern. This has not been a 
matter of discussion, but postponing it can be very serious, since the architecture of 
REDD+ will finally have certain local and national consequences if the market is 
considered or not19. Related to this, another concern is the possibility that developed 
countries can use the reduction of emissions achieved by REDD+ to offset their 
emissions. Addressing these and other issues is necessary to ensure the efficiency of the 
program in the future. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
19
 This concern is also verified in the sense that the most common projects in Peru have been those of the 
private market, belonging to the testing phase of REDD+ Early Actions, which apart from operating directly 
for the carbon market, does not observe clear mechanisms of participation. 
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Annex 2: Detailed list of the Mapped Institutions by Category. 
Government Research 
GORE Madre de Dios Instituto de Investigación Andino y de 
Derecho Ambiental (IIADA) 
GORE San Martín Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la 
Amazonía Peruana (IIAP) 
Dirección de Gestión Estratégica Ambiental Instituto del Bien Común (IBC) 
Autoridad Regional Ambiental del Gobierno 
Regional de San Martín 
Instituto Nacional de Investigación Agraria 
(INIA) 
GORE Ucayali Universidad Nacional de San Martín 
OEFA Centro Amazónico de Antropología y 
Aplicación Práctica - CAAAP 
PNCB  
PROFONANPE  
SERFOR  
SERNANP  
Viceministerio de Desarrollo Estratégico de 
los Recursos Naturales 
 
Viceministerio de Políticas Agrarias, 
Ministerio de Agricultura y Riego 
 
Comisión Nacional de Cambio Climático  
Mesa Regional de Loreto  
Mesa Regional de Madre de Dios  
Mesa Regional de Piura  
Mesa Regional de San Martin  
Mesa Regional de Ucayali  
OSINFOR  
OEFA  
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Civil Society 
Indigenous Representative 
Organization 
National NGO 
Grupo 
REDD+ 
AIDESEP ACCA 
Grupo Técnico 
de REDD 
(GTREDD) 
Centro de Culturas Indígenas del Perú 
(CHIRAPAQ) 
AIDER 
 COICA AMPA 
 CONAP APECO 
 FENAMAD CEDIA 
 Consejo Harakbut, Yine y Matsiguenka 
(COHARYIMA) 
Centro para la Sostenibilidad 
Ambiental (CSA) 
 Consejo Indígena de bajo Madre de Dios 
(COINBAMAD) 
CIMA 
 Asociación Forestal Indígena de Madre 
de Dios (AFIMAD) 
DAR 
 Ejecutor de Contrato de Administración 
de la Reserva Comunal Amarakaeri 
(ECA-RCA) 
DRIS 
 ASOCIACION NACIONAL DE 
EJECUTORES DEL CONTRATO DE 
ADMINISTRACION DE RESERVAS 
COMUNALES DEL PERU (ANECAP) 
Fundación Peruana para la 
Conservación de la Naturaleza 
(PRONAURALEZA) 
 Federación de Comunidades Shawis del 
Armanayacu (FECOSHARMA) 
GREENOXX 
 COORDINADORA DE 
DESARROLLO Y DEFENSA DE LOS 
PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS DE LA 
REGIÓN SAN MARTÍN 
(CODEPISAM) 
Se Perú 
 FEDERACION REGIONAL 
INDIGENA AWAJUN DEL ALTO 
MAYO (FERIAAM) 
SERVINDI 
 FEDERACION REGIONAL 
INDIGENA SHAWI DE SAN 
MARTIN (FERISHAM) 
SPDA 
 Federación de Pueblos Indígenas 
Kechwas de la Región San Martín 
(FEPIKRESAM) 
 
 Consejo Étnico de los Pueblos Kechwas 
de la Amazonia (CEPKA) 
 
 Federación de Comunidades Nativas 
Jebero (FECONAJE) 
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International NGO 
Donor and/or Technical 
Cooperation 
Consultant 
Agencia de Investigación 
Ambiental (EIA) 
Agencia de Cooperación 
Internacional del Japón (JICA), 
Asesorandes 
Alianza para el Clima Agencia de Estados Unidos para el 
Desarrollo Internacional (USAID) 
Carbon Decisions 
International (CDI) 
Asociación Suiza para la 
Cooperación Internacional 
(Helvetas) 
Agencia Noruega de Cooperación al 
Desarrollo (NORAD) 
Libélula 
Biodiversidad y Comunidad 
(CCBA) 
Agencia Suiza para el Desarrollo y la 
Cooperación (COSUDE) 
Terra Carbon 
Centro de Información 
Bancaria (BIC) 
Banco Alemán de Desarrollo 
(KFW) 
Winrock 
International 
Centro Mundial de 
Agroforestería (ICRAF) 
Cooperación Alemana al Desarrollo 
(GIZ) 
 
CIFOR FIP  
Conservación Internacional 
(CI) 
Gobierno de Alemania  
Fondo de Defensa Ambiental 
(EDF) 
Gobierno de Finlandia  
Forest Trends Gobierno de Japón  
Fundación Gordon y Betty 
Moore 
Gobierno de Noruega  
FUNDECOR (Costa Rica) Gobierno de Suiza  
Goblal Witness Gobierno de USA  
Grupo Katoomba Iniciativa para la Conservación de la 
Amazonía Andina (ICAA) 
 
Instituto Alemán de 
Desarrollo (DIE) 
Organización de Naciones Unidas 
para la Agricultura y la Alimentación 
(FAO) 
 
Instituto Carnegie Programa de las Naciones Unidas 
para el Desarrollo (PNUD) 
 
Instituto de Investigación 
Ambiental de la Amazonía 
(IPAM) 
Servicio Forestal de los Estados 
Unidos (USFS) 
 
Museo Field de Chicago FCPF  
Naturaleza y Conservación 
Internacional (NCI) 
ONU-REDD  
Organización para Estudios 
Tropicales (OET) 
REDD+ Partnership  
Programa para los Pueblos de 
los Bsoques (FPP) 
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo 
(BID) 
 
Rainforest Alliance   
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Sociedad para la Conservación 
de la Vida Silvestre (WCS) 
  
Sociedad Zoológica de 
Francfort (SZF) 
  
The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC) 
  
WRI   
WWF-Perú   
 
  
 
 
71 
 
Annex 3: Letter Model to Request the Filling of the Virtual Survey. 
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Annex 4: Letter Model to Request an Interview with the specialist. 
 
